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Practically
Can’t Be Done
These are the focus of our fire safety activities!
• Tasks “buy-down” the risk of fire for all manned exploration systems 3
What’s Different in Low-g and Exploration?
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Sample failing
NASA Test 1
 Material Flammability Screening
● NASA STD-6001 Test 1: Upward Flame Spread Test
● Test is conducted at the worst-case atmospheric conditions in which the material will be used 
• This has historically been 30% O2, 10.2 psia (shuttle pre-EVA atm)
• Future exploration atmospheres extend to 34% O2, 8.2 psia
• A material fails the test if it burns more than 15 cm (6 inches).
6” Gravity
Air Flow is very Important to a Flame
Buoyant or Forced 
Flow Direction
Opposed
Normal Gravity (Buoyancy) Microgravity
Concurrent Opposed Concurrent
 What does increasing flow do?
● Brings in oxygen
● Removes heat faster
● Reduces time for chemical 
reactions and heating
● Makes flame closer to the 
surface (fuel)
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Material Flammability Maps
 Material flammability depends on the 
ambient flow
 In 1-g, the flame determines the flow by 
buoyancy (natural convection) …
… but the material can burn just fine with a 
lower flow and at a lower oxygen 
concentration
 The 1-g flammability limit can be determined 
by NASA-STD-6001 Test 1
 No flow (quiescence) is least flammable but 
the crew needs fresh air to breathe
 Environmental control and life support flows 
are around 15-20 cm/s
● Right around the conditions where 
materials can still burn
----------------------------
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A Lot of Other Low-Gravity Implications!
 Where there’s fire, there’s not necessarily smoke.
 When it’s out, the hazard isn’t necessarily gone.
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Cloud of condensed wax 
vapor after extinction of 
low-g flame
Candle flame in 
normal (left)
and low-gravity 
(middle). The low-
g flame emits 
little, if any smoke.
A Lot of Other Low-Gravity Implications!
 Flames can spread preferentially upstream
– Into the incoming fresh air
 Ejecta from a melting solid (or firebrands) don’t 
settle and can travel farther in low-g
 Detection of aerosol or gaseous fire signatures 
depends on ventilation … which also aids flame 
spread Flame spreads preferentially upstream, opposite that 
in 1g. Paper is centrally ignited in low-speed opposed-
air flows (1 and 2 cm/s).
Ejection of burning 
material
PMMA
Low-gravity
Normal-gravity 8
Ambient conditions depend on mission objectives
 The Exploration Atmospheres Working Group convened in 2004 and 2012 to provide 
recommendations for the cabin atmosphere for exploration vehicles
PMMA
Mercury/Gemini/ApolloSkylab
Early Apollo Design
Shuttle-EVA
Shuttle/Mir/ISS
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Normoxic Equivalent
Hypoxic Boundary
Historical Designs
Decompression 
sickness on EVA
Flammability
Hypoxia
 Selection attempts to balance 
competing effects of 
flammability, decompression 
sickness, and hypoxia
 Long-distance transport 
would favor standard 
atmosphere conditions
 Known impact on crew and 
equipment
 Surface operations with 
frequent EVA would favor 
higher %O2 and hypoxic 
operation
 Trade crew performance 
against time for pre-breathe
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What does NASA do to prevent/respond to fires?
 Material Flammability
– NASA-STD-6001: Flammability, Odor, Offgassing, and
Compatibility Requirements and Test Procedures for
Materials in Environments that Support Combustion
 Test 1: Upward Flame Spread Test
– Materials that fail Test 1 must undergo additional testing and/or 
configuration control as defined by NASA Materials and 
Processes personnel
 Minimize ignition sources
– To the extent possible, designs attempt to minimize sources of 
ignition
 Fire Detection
– On ISS, smoke detectors are positioned near air return vents
– FGB and SM smoke detectors use different technology
(ionization) than US smoke detector (photoelectric)
 ISS Fire Extinguishers
– US: gaseous CO2, Fine water mist
– RS: Water-based foam
Sample failing
NASA Test 1
FGB SD 
SM SD
US SD
US CO2 fire 
extinguisher
Engineering Development 
Unit of an ISS FWM PFE
Engineering 
Development Unit of 
an Orion FWM PFE 10
Large-Scale Fire Demonstration
 We can conduct ground tests to assess many 
of these technologies but the data needs to be 
anchored using low-g data obtained at relevant 
length and time scales
 Testing requires:
– Low-g
– Large scale
– Relevant range of conditions including reduced 
pressure and elevated oxygen
– Large volume
 We proposed and developed the concept of 
conducting a large-scale fire on an ISS 
resupply vehicle after it left the ISS.
FAA full-scale aircraft test  
Submarine Fire Facility 
Naval Research Laboratory
Ex-USS Shadwell 
Coal dust test explosion
NIST full-scale fire test
Examples of Terrestrial Large-Scale Fire Experiments
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Saffire-I, II, & III Overview
Needs:
 Low-g flammability limits for spacecraft materials
 Definition of realistic fires for exploration vehicles
‒ Fate of a large-scale spacecraft fire
Objectives:
 Saffire-I: Assess flame spread of large-scale
microgravity fire (spread rate, mass 
consumption, heat release)
 Saffire-II: Verify oxygen flammability limits in low 
gravity
 Saffire-III: Same as Saffire-I but at different flow 
conditions.
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Fans
Power
Management
Cameras
Signal
conditioning
card
Sample card
(flame spread
sample shown)
Flow
straightener
Flow DuctAvionics Bay
Saffire module consists of a flow duct containing the 
sample card and an avionics bay. All power, computer, 
and data acquisition modules are contained in the bay. 
Dimensions are approximately 53- by 90- by 133-cm
• Data obtained from the experiment will be used to 
validate modeling of spacecraft fire response scenarios
• Evaluate NASA’s normal-gravity material flammability 
screening test for low-gravity conditions.
Sample Card Holder Configurations
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Saffire-I, -III Sample Card
Composite fabric (SIBAL cloth)
(75% cotton – 25% fiberglass by mass)
(0.4 m x 0.95 m)
Saffire-II Sample Card
 Sample card and samples are the only differences between the three flight units 
Saffire-II Samples (5 cm x 29 cm)
• PMMA (flat and structured)
• Silicone (3 thicknesses, different 
ignition direction)
• SIBAL
• Nomex (with PMMA ignition)
Operations Concept
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Hawaii WGS
Pre-Launch
Unpowered
Inhibits Open
Powered
Inhibits
Closed
Saffire Operations
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 Operations received considerable coverage on 
social media
 NASA GRC and AES
Above: Saffire-II Mission Support Teams at NASA-
GRC; Left: Saffire-II Flight Operations Team at Mission 
Control Dulles (backroom data assessment); Far Left: 
Saffire and Orbital ATK Flight Operations Teams at 
Mission Control-Dulles
Mission
Launch 
Site
Launch 
Vehicle
Integration Launch Mission Ops
Saffire-I OA-6 KSC Atlas Jan 25, 2016 Mar 22, 2016 June 14, 2016
Saffire-II OA-5 WFF Antares May 12, 2016 Oct 17, 2016 Nov 21, 2016
Saffire-III OA-7 KSC Atlas Feb 3, 2017 April 18, 2017 June 4, 2017
Saffire-III Operations
Concurrent Flow Igniter
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Image of the Saffire-III concurrent (upstream) burn.
Flow
(25 cm/s)
Still image of the Saffire-I material burning in 
normal gravity. 
Gravity
 Two of the most important 
factors for crew safety 
during on-board fires are:
1. How bad can the cabin 
conditions get during a fire?
2. How quickly can they get 
bad?
 Fire is only the beginning –
combustion products 
(smoke, CO, acid gases, …) 
also contribute to the hazard
 Images were taken 20 sec 
after ignition
 Both samples are 40 cm 
wide
Saffire-I and III Results
 Left: Sequence of concurrent flame images from 
Saffire-I and III.
 Each image is 40-sec apart.
 Saffire-I burned for 400 sec
 Saffire-III burned for 320 sec
 The flame speed is proportional to the air flow velocity
Saffire-III (25 cm/s)Saffire-I (20 cm/s)
 The flame images 
were taken at 
different times 
(near the end of 
each burn) and 
superimposed.
 Below: Comparison of the opposed (upper) and 
concurrent (lower) flames from Saffire-III.
25 cm/s
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Saffire-II Summary
1
2
3
4
9
8
7
6
5
 Samples 1-4: Silicone sheets of varying thickness (0.25 mm, 0.61 mm, 1.03 mm, 0.36 mm respectively)
– Samples ignited but flame did not propagate
 Samples 5-6: SIBAL cloth (20 cm/s and 25 cm/s - same as Saffire-I and III)
– Burned to completion
 Sample 7: Nomex with PMMA igniter (1 mm thick PMMA)
– PMMA burned ; flame did not propagate into Nomex
 Sample 8-9: Structured and Flat PMMA (10 mm thick)
– Burned for the entire duration (6; 12 min); extinguished
when flow ceased
Composite picture of samples 
1-9 at end of experiment. 
Streaks are soot from 
Samples 7-9 deposited on 
card.
Flow
Saffire-I-III Results
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Measurements of flame base, pyrolysis tip, and pyrolysis
length from concurrent and opposed burns from Saffire-I.
The flame base is the most upstream portion of the flame and is
bright and well-defined. The pyrolysis tip is the most downstream
portion of the blackened (charred) fuel. The fuel was a 40.6-cm-
wide cotton-fiberglass fabric. Air flow speed was 20 cm/s.
Spread rate summary for Cotton/Fiberglass fabric 
burning in microgravity
Summary of Saffire Results…So Far!
Saffire-I & III
• Flame reaches a limiting length in forced convective concurrent flow even for very wide sample
– Implies a steady spread rate and a limiting heat release rate
– A fire on a spacecraft vehicle may reach a steady size (?)
• Concurrent flame spread is proportional to the flow velocity
• Concurrent flame spread rate was much slower than expected from previous space experiments
– 65% less than observed in Burning and Suppression of Solids experiment on ISS
– What is the impact of slower growth on release of combustion products? On fire detection? How does this 
depend on flow velocity?
• Proximity to and interaction with side walls appears to impact the flame more than expected
– Needs to be better understood through computational models; Review results of previous microgravity 
experiments 
• Opposed flames spread at about the same rate as concurrent flames
– How does this depend on flow velocity?
– Are concurrent flames always the worst case for microgravity fires?
• We need to make a bigger fire to impact the vehicle
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Summary of Saffire Results…So Far!
Saffire-II
• Materials that burned all had slower spread rates than expected
– Composite fabric, PMMA
• Flame spread rates on composite fabric were similar to those seen in Saffire-I
– Rapidly reached a steady spread rate and a limiting heat release rate
• Examining material flammability limits in microgravity using a limited number of experiments is 
difficult
– Repeat cases are required to understand the competing phenomena
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Saffire-IV, V, and VI Summary
Needs:
 Demonstrate spacecraft fire monitoring and 
cleanup technologies in a realistic spacecraft fire 
scenario
 Characterize fire growth in high O2,
low pressure atmospheres
 Provide data to validate models of realistic 
spacecraft fire scenarios
Objectives:
 Saffire-IV: Assess flame spread of large-scale 
microgravity fire (spread rate, mass 
consumption, heat release) in 
exploration atmosphere
 Saffire-V: Evaluate fire behavior on realistic 
geometries
 Saffire-VI: Assess existing material 
configuration control guidelines
 All flights will demonstrate fire monitoring
and response technology
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Far Field Diagnostics (in Mid Deck Locker)
Avionics, CO2 scrubber, Smoke Eater, Combustion Products Monitor, 
particulate monitors (DustTrack & Ion Chamber)
Remote Sensors (6)
Measure temp & CO2 in standoffs,
hatch and end cone
Saffire Flow Unit
Approx. 53x90x133cm. New 
features include 2 side view 
cameras, acid gas, O2, heat and 
byproduct release to cabin 
Saffire-IV, V, and VI Experiment Concept
 Concept consists of three distinct 
hardware locations
 Saffire flow unit
 Far-field diagnostic
 Distributed sensors
 Far-field diagnostic module
 Combustion product monitor
 CO and CO2 sensors
 Post-fire cleanup module
 Distributed sensor network
 Temperature
 CO2
23
Far Field 
Diagnostics (FFD)
Saffire
Flow Unit 
(SFU)
Remote Sensors (RS)  
[6 total, 2 end cones, 4 central]
Expected Results of the
Saffire-IV, V, and VI Experiments
 Flammability in normal and exploration atmospheres
 Traceability to Saffire-I, II, and III
 Oxygen calorimetry for a large-scale microgravity fire
 Rate of heat release for fire scenario modeling
 Rate of change of cabin pressure and temperature during a large-scale fire
 Transport and mixing of an inert gas (CO2)
 Fire detection
 Fire scenario modeling
 Demonstration of advanced combustion product monitor to quantify CO, CO2, and acid gases 
(HF, HCl)
 Transport/decay of acid gases in a post-fire environment
 Demonstration of advanced sorbents for cleanup of CO and CO2
 Sizing of smoke-eater for exploration applications
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Other Considerations for Exploration
 Dormancy
 Many of the mission scenarios include vehicles that 
are uncrewed and in a dormant state for extended 
periods of time.
 Dormancy impacts protocols for detection, 
suppression and cleanup
– Dormancy before crew arrives
– Dormancy between crew visits
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 Partial Gravity
 Habitats on a anticipated planets, moons, or 
asteroids will have buoyant convection but at a 
smaller flow velocity than Earth
 There are limited facilities on Earth in which we 
can conduct partial-gravity flame spread tests
Ferkul, P.V. and Olson, S.L., “Zero-gravity Centrifuge  Used for the 
Evaluation of material Flammability in Lunar-Gravity,”  AIAA 2010-6260, 
40th International Conference on Environmental Systems, Barcelona, 
Spain, July 11-15, 2010.
Fire Safety Strategy Depends On Vehicle State During Dormancy
 Is there ECLSS ventilation?
‒ Pro: can use ventilation for fire detection
‒ Con: first response is to terminate ventilation after a fire alarm
‒ Impact: When can ventilation be re-initiated?
 What is the atmospheric composition?
 Lower O2 mole fraction (<15%), lower P, T reduces fire risk - periodic monitoring
 Maintaining habitable environment requires continuous monitoring
‒ Pro: can make the atmosphere unable to support combustion
‒ Con: must increase O2 mole fraction before crew returns
‒ Impact: Does increasing O2 for a “short” time increase risk significantly?
 What systems are powered during dormancy?
‒ Pro: can monitor system state for abnormal current draw; terminate power if an electrical short is 
detected
‒ Con: powered systems are the most likely ignition source
‒ Impact: When can power be restored?
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Fire Safety Strategy Depends On Vehicle State During Dormancy
 Is there gravity?
‒ Pro: In microgravity, termination of ventilation and power will most likely be effective for fire suppression
‒ Con: In a gravity field, propagation of fire is uncertain even if ventilation and power is removed
‒ Impact: When can power and ventilation be re-initiated?
 If a fire is detected, at what point do you initiate an active response?
‒ How do you confirm that any passive responses were not effective?
 Monitoring is effective but takes time
 Visual confirmation of the vehicle state would be effective
‒ Pro: An active response can assuredly extinguish a fire
‒ Con: (1) An active response changes the state of the vehicle
(2) Active response during dormancy requires a fixed fire suppression system; mass, risk of failure 
(on or off)
‒ Impact: Clean-up of the suppression agent. When can power and ventilation be re-initiated?
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Summary
 Low- and partial-gravity impacts many areas of the combustion process and, therefore, spacecraft 
fire safety
 Mission scenarios play a major role in determining the fire hazard…
… and fire safety is never the driving factor!
 The Saffire missions were developed to investigate many of the knowledge gaps in spacecraft fire 
safety
 Saffire-I-III primarily investigated flame spread and material flammability limits
 Future Saffire missions will investigate advanced material flammability questions as well as 
fire/vehicle interactions
 Missions will also demonstrate technologies needed to protect the spacecraft and crew
 Periods of spacecraft or habitat dormancy pose unique hazards for fire safety
 Primarily operational issues rather than new technology development
 Need to have data in hand so that the operational environment and configuration can be appropriately 
analyzed 
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